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ABSTRACT
Increasing use of steganography in espionage and exfiltration of company se-
crets means that it is important to find ways to detect such activity. Because the
amount of data being transferred is also growing, channels that can hide larger
amounts of data are going to become increasingly attractive. This research will
focus on detecting hidden data in one such medium, namely MPEG video.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Steganography is the process of hiding information in “plain sight”. Secret
communication is possible by modifying a cover medium is to embed data. An
analog example might be adding microscopic dots to an image or document. Digital
steganography manipulates bits of data to embed the secret message with minimal
impact on the interpretation of the original data.
Video steganography is an emerging sub-field of digital steganography. Most
digital steganographic methods have relied on exploiting file formats to hide infor-
mation in parts of files either not parsed or parts invisible to the user in normal
processing and use. Some more advanced methods hide data in the noise pro-
duced by lossy compression formats, such as JPEG images or MP3 audio files. For
example, compare the two flowers in Figure 1 and try to decide which is stegged.
Many of the JPEG image steganographic techniques carry over to MPEG
video, however the steganalysis for video can be different because of the increase
in the volume of data. Given the relatively high capacity of video, it is likely that it
will be the next most popular carrier to discreetly transfer large amounts of data.
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Clean and stegged versions of an image
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The adoption rate of steganography in general and video steganography in par-
ticular is not well known, however there have been recent accounts in the news of
law enforcement finding evidence of its use on suspect machines. Since steganogra-
phy scanning tools are not yet mature enough for regular use, most of the evidence
comes from steganographic tools themselves being installed.
Videos provide fairly high bandwidth for data embedding and are frequently
posted and transferred on-line. The goal of steganalysis is to reduce the effective
bit rate of data embedding in video by reliably detecting the higher embedding
rates.
This research will focus on developing methods to detect steganography in
digital video. The highest capacity channel in video is changing the Discrete Cosine
Transform (DCT) coefficients that are used to encode frames of video. This method
is easy to implement based on adaptations of existing JPEG steganographic tools
to MPEG encoders, and therefore is likely to be the most prolific type.
Chapter 2 provides background on MPEG compression, digital steganography
and digital steganalysis. Chapter 3 presents the methodology that this project de-
veloped for video steganalysis. The results of this method are found in Chapter 4.
Finally, concluding remarks and a discussion of the future direction of video ste-
ganalysis is presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
In order to understand the problem space, it is necessary to first describe
how digital steganography works and how it is applied during compression MPEG
video. The following presents only the relevant parts of the MPEG specification.
Examination of how data can be hidden and how others have sought to find will
follow.
2.1 MPEG Compression
Almost all lossy compression techniques that deal with perceived media exploit
that human senses do not distinguish small changes in high frequency information.
Visually this manifests as high detail areas of an image. In raw video every pixel
is represented by 3 bytes, either by separating into red, green and blue (RGB), or,
more likely, luma and two chroma components, called YUV or YCbCr. The human
eye is less sensitive to color than intensity so MPEG always encodes using YUV
with the chroma components down sampled by a factor of two horizontally and
vertically. To aid the removal of high frequency data, MPEG uses Discrete Cosine
Transform (DCT) to convert the raw (spatial) data into the frequency domain.
It does this in 8×8 blocks of pixels. The upper left coefficient is called the DC
coefficient and represents an average intensity across the block, and the rest are
AC coefficients. The DCT coefficients that come from the conversion are then
divided (quantized) by amounts weighted by their importance. For example, the
lowest frequency, the DC coefficient, is always divided by 8, whereas the highest
frequency component is divided by 83 in the default quantization matrix [1]. The
default quantization matrix is designed to give the best trade-off in compression
and image quality.
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MPEG files typically have three types of video frames. These are called Intra-
coded, Predictive-coded, and Bidirectionally predictive-coded, however they are
usually abbreviated to I, P, or B frames. I-frames are entirely encoded using DCT
values as discussed above. P-frames and B-frames are coded with reference to other
I- or P-frames, as shown in the top of Figure 2. These references are in the form of
motion vectors that indicate blocks to copy, as shown in the bottom of Figure 2.
If it were a direct copy, this would reduce the 256 DCT values for a block to 2–4
values for the x and/or y offsets. In most cases, there is some residual change,
so the difference between the copied block and the new block may be encoded as
a DCT block, however, of such small energy, both in terms of value count and
magnitude, that it takes less space to encode [1]. If no appropriate block is found
in a reference frame, that block is converted to DCT coefficients directly.
For steganography, the DCT values in any or all of these frame types may be
changed by a small amount with little distortion to the image when it is decoded.
The technique is borrowed from JPEG steganography, which uses a similar DCT
transform for its compression. The steganalysis techniques that are in use here are
then also borrowed and adapted from the JPEG domain.
I B B P B B P
Motion Vector
I P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 2. Frame references and motion vectors in MPEG
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2.2 Digital Steganography
Digital steganography embeds information into binary data by subtly changing
bits that do not have a significant effect on their interpretation. For example,
consider a bitmap image file. The structure of the file is fairly simple, with a small
bit of metadata at the beginning that identifies the type of file, image dimensions
and color attributes, followed by the pixel data. Incorrect modification of any of
the 50 byte header could make an image renderer fail or report an error. Changing
the pixel data, however, will not stop it from rendering properly. Changing a
single pixel by a small amount will probably not lead to a perceptible change in
the image, depending on the complexity of the image. For a photograph quality
picture, almost all of the values might be changed by ±1 with no degradation [2].
This research looks at changes to the visual data, not the metadata.
For the purposes of this project, steganography and watermarking work in-
terchangeably, however watermarking is usually more focused on perceptual invis-
ibility and less on statistical invisibility. That is, a watermark should not change
the appearance of the video, however attempting to remove the watermark should
destroy the quality of the video. Detection of the existence of a watermark is usu-
ally not considered as a criterion. Most watermarks embed data that resolves to a
black and white image, however that is not required.
2.2.1 Images
While digital steganography can take many forms, it has achieved most of
its popularity in images. This is mostly because of the prevalence of images and
their relatively high capacity. Early forms of image steganography took the form
of changing the least significant bits of pixel color values[3, 4]. Pixel based least-
significant-bit (LSB) steganography is unreliable when images are compressed us-
ing lossy JPEG compression, which is the most common image file type.
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Steganography in JPEG images is easy to implement using libraries that give
direct access to the quantized DCT coefficients. Several implementations of this
exist ([5, 6, 7, 8]). Changing these values (usually by LSB bit-flipping) and then
storing them back produces steganography that is much harder to detect than
changing pixel values directly, despite that this change will effect a larger visual
block (8×8 pixels).
2.2.2 Video
There are many stages at which data may be embedded into compressed digital
video. The first stage would work in the spatial domain directly, changing the
actual color values [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. These techniques usually do not survive
compression, so they require error correcting codes to ensure data fidelity. The
second stage would be during frequency transform. This can be done with either
Discrete Cosine Transform [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20] or Discrete Wavelet Transform
[21]. There is also an example in [20] of changing the value of motion vectors to
embed data, although this will generally have a lower bit-rate. Finally, in [22], they
change Huffman code pairs for AC coefficients in the bit stream directly. This has
the advantage of being fast because the video is not fully decoded to images.
Watermarking techniques such as [9] are designed to withstand noise attacks
by embedding data throughout several bit planes of the image. Bit planes are
single bit cross-sections of an image which provide different levels of detail. Most
steganographic techniques will only modify the least significant bit, or the lowest
numbered bit-plane. By modifying higher bit planes (up to the fourth bit plane),
[9] assures that trying to destroy the watermark also destroys the video. As in
most watermarking techniques, data fidelity is not significant as long as strong
correlation with the known watermark signal is found.
In [10] the goal is to avoid detection of the watermark, as well as provide
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resistance. By using only embedding the watermark in several small regions within
a frame, and consistently identifying those regions across frames in a scene, they
provide resistance against cropping and row/column deletion.
Although Discrete Wave Transform(DWT) is similar to DCT, since it is a type
of frequency transform, data embedded using DWT will go back into the spatial
domain before the video compression starts. Because it does not necessarily use the
same block size as DCT, data embedded via DWT can be more robust than either
DCT or spatial embeddings. This is shown in [13] by performing watermarking
in several frequency bands and showing the results of various attacks. The other
pre-compression DWT example in [12] uses the high frequency bands to determine
where embedding in the low frequency bands will have the least impact.
Although not widely used, Motion-JPEG2000 uses DWT for video compres-
sion. In [21], they look at changing the bits of the DWT coefficients based on a
complexity metric.
Since MPEGs also contain motion vector information, which provides sub-
pixel resolution in block copies, there is room for some data to be embedded there
without disturbing the image quality. This is the technique used in [20]. Since
only P and B frames contain motion vectors, they also use DCT embedding in the
I frame for control information needed by their algorithm.
By analyzing a given MPEG video, [22] finds unused variable-length-code
(VLC) pairs that are used in the lossless compression phase. By using a “key” of
these unused pairs, and modifying existing VLCs in the compressed stream, data
can be embedded easily. This method has a very low bit-rate and can sometimes
have a large key size.
In the category this project is focusing on, that of DCT embedding, there
are several watermarking techniques, but no steganographic implementations. In
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[16] they embed data in the mid-range frequency coefficients where the complexity
of the data embedded is less than the block it is being inserted into. Removing
high-frequency coefficients to produce a pattern across blocks is employed in [17].
Adapting the embedding rate based on quality and frame type is done in [18]. An
MPEG-4 based implementation is offered in [14] where testing shows that data
embedding is visually noticeable in low bit rate videos.
2.3 Digital Steganalysis
This section is broken into two pieces. The first explains some of the work
done with static images, which has direct applicability to video in that they use
similar encodings. The second piece explains the work that has been done with
video.
2.3.1 Images
While pixel-based LSB embedding is easy to implement and visually unde-
tectable if there are no solid color areas in the image, it is also fairly easy to detect
by simple statistics [23].
Most current work looks at DCT embedded steganography. Early attempts to
detect this type of steganography using techniques such as image quality metrics [2]
and wavelets [24, 25]. There have been also been many approaches to detecting
DCT-based steganography[26, 27, 28]. However, in [29] Fridrich achieves the best
performance to date, with percent accuracies in the high nineties for some stegano-
graphic programs at 25% of the maximum embedding rate. There are two reasons
this technique works so well. The first is by using a reference image for “calibra-
tion”. In “blind” steganalysis, the original non-stegged image is not available for
comparison. By slightly cropping the suspect image, it is possible to create an
image that is similar enough to make a good approximation. The approximation
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is then used as a comparison for the statistics from the original. The second reason
for increased accuracy is from focusing on exactly the data is being changed. It
is specifically looking at the distribution of DCT values both between blocks and
within blocks, whereas other the techniques were looking at less specific metrics,
in hopes of detecting many types of steganography. It is this set of features that
will form the basis of the work here, as the focus is on DCT encoded embeddings
in MPEG.
Previous work
The URI research group has done previous work[30] in the area of image ste-
ganalysis by evaluating some feature sets, starting with Farid’s work with Wavelets
[31] and ending with Fridrich’s work in [29]. Fridrich’s feature sets showed the best
accuracy, and were then evaluated under varying conditions. In particular, whereas
previously the models were built with images against one quality level and then
only tested against images of the same quality, our group evaluated using fewer
models that spanned ranges of quality. Ranges of 10% image quality gave suffi-
ciently good results, and then images of quality less than 50% are easily classified
by the 50%-59% range model. Thus only 5 models need to be built, instead of
100. In addition, a model trained with a low embedding rate did well in detecting
images with higher embedding rates, which gives a further reduction in the number
of models necessary.
2.3.2 Video
For video steganalysis, an early but comprehensive treatment is from Bud-
hia [32]. This work looked at detecting data embedded using additive white Gaus-
sian noise in the spatial domain. By using data from surrounding frames, which
they call collusion, an estimation of the current frame is achieved. Several different
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collusion approaches are tried, including simple linear averaging, weighted averag-
ing and block based reconstruction of reference frames. Block based reconstruction
searches for similar blocks in nearby frames and copies them into a new reference
frame. The difference of this reference frame and the original is then used to es-
timate the embedded data. Their features use statistics such as kurtosis, entropy,
and 25th percentile over this estimation. They mention that their technique can
apply to the DCT domain and test it using two different methods of embedding,
though without considering the encoding process (for example, P/B frames).
A performance enhancement on [32] is proposed by Jainsky in MoViSteg [33]
which also uses motion estimation to reconstruct a frame. They employ an asymp-
totic relative efficiency based detector, which “is efficient for large samples and
weak signals” [33]. The detector uses an adaptive threshold that is based on
statistics from sample frames in the video. While they do not give overall accu-
racy, they report at 60% true positive to 10% false positive rate at 75 dB Peak
Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (PSNR).
Most recently in [34], B. and F. Liu use collusion with a window of frames
limited by a predetermined correlation threshold. They use a simple linear collu-
sion that averages the surrounding frames. While they obtain good results (from
88–100% at 40% embedding, depending on the embedding scheme), the water-
marking techniques they test against make very distinctive changes in the DCT
values used. Two of them increase the range of values, which will show up in the
global histogram. Another simply removes several DCT values in select blocks,
which would cause noise in the dual histogram.
2.3.3 Tools
Most of the implementation of this project used MATLAB [35] for manipula-
tion of frame data. Because of its natural ability to deal with multi-dimensional
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data, manipulating and gathering data is easily expressed in its programming lan-
guage. For example, sum(I(:)∼ = 0) expresses the number of non-zero elements in
an array, regardless of the number of dimensions. Additionally, some of the exist-
ing image steganography and steganalysis work was available in MATLAB form.
MPEG encoder [36] and decoder[37] libraries were also available as C extensions
to MATLAB.
The frame classifiers used the Linear Discriminant Analysis implementation
from the statistical programming language R [38]. R was able to import the
features extracted, build and evaluate models, and classify the frames. Other
scripts converted the frame classifications into video classifications.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
The goal of this project, to classify videos as stegged or not stegged, requires
several steps. The first is to convert raw videos into MPEG. Raw videos must
be used to ensure that the stream has not been re-compressed, which can confuse
the steganalysis[1]. The next step embeds data into the MPEG files to create
the stegged files. Steganalysis then extracts data from the stegged files to create
features for the statistical classifier. Because the steganalysis methods are derived
from image steganalysis, the features are output on a per frame basis. The statisti-
cal classifier will then make the decision on whether each frame is stegged. Finally,
the video steganalysis looks at some or all of the frames to determine if the entire
video is stegged.
3.1 Video Steganography
Before video steganalysis could begin, a prototype video steganography tool
needed to be developed. Although there is at least one freely available tool that
embeds data into video, it does so at the pixel level, before compression. Because
the data is embedded before compression, much of the data could be lost during
compression. To get around this requires repeated embedding with error correcting
codes, which significantly reduces the capacity of the channel. Embedding after
compression makes this unnecessary unless the goal is to outwit an “active warden”
that manipulates the video, by re-compression, for example.
As the techniques under evaluation for steganalysis in this project are based
on DCT modification, the first step of the project was to use techniques for image
steganalysis and modify them to work frame-by-frame on video. A version of the
reference MPEG encoder [2] and decoder[3] designed for MATLAB is used for this
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purpose. Modifications to these MATLAB routines were made to extract the DCT
values into MATLAB arrays during decoding, and to allow those modified arrays
to be used during encoding. The arrays are modified in MATLAB. The algorithms
used are described in the next section. The modified coefficients are then written
to a new file that is otherwise identical to the cover video.
Normally during compression of blocks of P and B frames, the difference be-
tween the re-rendered block from the reference frame and the original is computed.
The decision to use intra-coding, i.e., DCT values, is based on the variance of this
difference for the block. Because embedding data may actually decrease this vari-
ance, it is possible that the modification could create DCT values that, if tested,
would suggest it should not have been encoded. A good MPEG steganographic
program would avoid making these types of changes. Analysis of P and B frames
for most videos suggests that they do not hold as much data, and so might not be
worth using anyway.
Data generation
The stegged videos used for analysis were created using all combinations of
two algorithms, two video qualities, and five embedding rates. The video qualities
are normal (qscale=2) and low quality (qscale=5). The embedding rates were
chosen to match previous work done with images for comparison. The following is
a summary of those parameters, and the description follows:
steg algorithm Our SimpleSteg routines, as well as a modified MBSteg were used
to embed data
qscale A quality parameter used during MPEG encoding. Values tested were 2
and 5.
embedding rate Percentage of DCT coefficients changed. Rates tested were: 5,
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10, 15, 20, 50
Two steganographic algorithms were implemented for testing the steganalysis
techniques against. SimpleSteg is our own routine that changes all AC coefficients
with abs(x) > 1 until the embedding rate is reached. The other steganography
algorithm is version of MBSteg[4] altered slightly to work with video data. MBSteg
attempts to keep the global and individual histograms unchanged as well as remove
the “blockiness” that can occur when changing DCT values.
The qscale parameter changes the coarseness of the quantization done during
encoding. Larger values reduce the range of values possible, including helping to
bring the higher frequency coefficients, which are already typically small values, to
zero. This shrinks the size of the file, as well as the amount of data that can be
embedded.
The embedding rate directly affects the number of coefficients changed. For
SimpleSteg the number is a strict percentage. MBSteg has a more complicated
capacity measurement based on the number of times each value appears and an
estimate of how many values can be modified while keeping an approximate shape
of the global histogram.
Videos
A collection of standard YUV formatted videos were used as input to both
algorithms. There is some variety in the videos in terms of content. Some are
fairly static, like a video conference call or a news broadcaster, and others have a
lot of motion, such as traveling down a highway, or panning the camera across a
scene with moving objects. All of the videos were truncated to the first 150 frames
to limit the time to process. They are all common raw YUV test videos. A list of
the compressed sizes is presented in Table 1.
Because all of these videos are the same length, the difference in file sizes is
17
video Q2 size Q5 size
akiyo 161256 70683
bridge-close 594656 190128
bridge-far 332107 79374
carphone 478591 155334
claire 162909 63956
coastguard 923420 314816
container 221854 89186
foreman 608552 211669
grandma 254345 78485
hall 372085 122013
highway 617045 184077
miss-america 227756 57293
mobile 1736370 684755
mother-daughter 259454 87403
news 323714 141798
salesman 326987 118553
silent 340931 138884
suzie 358455 112802
Table 1. List of videos
due to a combination of two factors. One is the amount of movement between
frames. The more movement there is, the more likely new blocks need to be
coded, or blocks that have moved need larger changes. There are two types of
movement. The simpler case is where objects in the frame are moving. Motion
vectors can mostly cover this. The more complex case is camera motion. If the
camera is panning, then new blocks are being added at the edges, and the rest
of the blocks are moving. If the camera is zooming, then all of the blocks will
change, although it depends on the exact scenery and the rate of zoom how much
change this creates. The ’mobile’ video has all of the above factors with the camera
zooming out, panning left while viewing a toy train, which accounts for its much
larger size.
Although embedding data into a video by slightly changing the DCT coeffi-
cients should not seem to change the size of the file, it does. This happens because
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the coefficients are encoded using a variable length encoding scheme (VLC) where
certain values might be much longer than others, even though they only differ by
one. Because of the way that MBSteg models the DCT coefficients into buckets,
the types of changes it makes are not least significant bit changes. That is, it will
change an 1 to a 2 (or vice versa), which swaps two bits. This is different from
our SimpleSteg which always only flips the last bit. The cumulative effect of these
changes, when passed through the VLC encoding, is that MBSteg embedded files
are slightly smaller (less than 1% up to 50% embedding) than the clean version,
whereas SimpleSteg embedded files are slightly larger (less than 2% up to 50%
embedding).
3.2 Video Steganalysis
To determine if a video is stegged using the above techniques, the first step will
be to determine if the individual frames are stegged. Because of the similarity of
JPEG and MPEG, and of the steganographic technique, it follows that the feature
sets used in DCT-JPEG steganography will apply here as well. Once the frames
are classified, another classification is done with those results to decide if the video
as a whole is stegged.
As discussed in section 2.3, there are many feature sets available for images
that could be used. Here only two are explored. The reasoning is that our prior
work [5, 6] with the Fridrich/Pevny´ set shows its accuracy to be very high. The
other feature set used is [7] which is a little bit more recent. While a good feature
set is important, the methodology used here can easily be updated to newer feature
sets as they become available.
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3.2.1 Feature Sets Description
Through a series of papers[8, 9, 10, 11], Fridrich et al. developed a compre-
hensive set of features for DCT based steganalysis. The set used in the final paper
can be broken up into seven parts:
• The first part looks at the global histogram of DCT values across the image.
In particular, it is a count of the number of occurrences of the values −5..5
in any position in all blocks.
• The second part is a set of histograms for 5 of the lowest frequency AC
coefficients, over the same −5..5 range.
• The third part are dual histograms across 9 of the lowest frequency AC
coefficients, capturing distribution of the values.
• The fourth part is a measure variation across all the DCT modes.
• The fifth part is a measure of the “blockiness” of the image, measured in the
spatial domain.
• The sixth part is a co-occurrence matrix of pairs of neighboring DCT coeffi-
cients.
• The seventh part uses a Markov process based approach that observes the
difference of DCT modes across neighboring blocks.
The Liu feature set from [7] measures the joint occurrence of small valued
DCT coefficients both within a block, and across adjacent blocks. For example,
it will look at how many times AC coefficient (3,2) = 2 when AC coefficient (2,1)
= 4, both within the same block, and then with both the block to the right and
the block below. The range of coefficients to look for is a parameter, which the
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authors set to −6..6 for a total of 169 features, and this value is also used in our
testing.
3.2.2 Frame Classification
The Fridrich[11] feature set is used as a baseline. Liu’s feature set, which
is slightly more recent, gives a comparison point. Although extensions to these
were planned that would included inter-frame statistics, the tests using next frame
approximation, discussed next, indicated that this would be of limited value since
the noise from motion outweighs the noise from the steganographic data.
For the approximation of the cover frame needed in the Fridrich set, three
different approaches were taken.
cropping The first method is the same cropping and re-compression of the image
done in [11]. This involves converting the frame back to the spatial domain,
cropping the image by four pixels in both directions and then re-compressing
the result. The reason for using 4 pixels is to cut the 8x8 block used in the
DCT transform, but not significantly change the image. The re-compressed
image will have similar DCT coefficients that can be used in the approxima-
tion.
next-frame The second approximation technique simply uses the next frame of
the video, which should be fairly close to the current frame unless there is a
scene cut, which happen infrequently.
frame-averaging The last method is one of the approximation methods from [12]
that averaged frames on either side of the one under consideration. Averaging
frames from either side can give two benefits. First, it reduces the effect from
a scene change that the next-frame method might have. Second, frame under
consideration could be considered the middle of the frames before and after,
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so their average will be closer than either one of those frames. In [12] they
find that in most cases one frame from each side is sufficient.
Note that to do either of these last two requires manually recalculating nearly
all of the DCT values for most frames, since in most cases they do not appear in
the bitstream. For example, following an I frame is either a P or B frame. Since
these frame types usually do not encode much of the picture as full DCT values,
instead being residual values from motion vectors, the full spatial frame needs to
be re-transformed to DCT values. The cropping method also needs to do this
transform for one the equivalent of one frame per frame, and so is the same as
using the next frame in complexity.
3.2.3 Video Classification
The above describes only a decision process for an single frame. Since a video
consists of several frames, and the goal is to decide if the video as a whole is stegged,
a separate decision procedure is required. The obvious choice, taken in [12], may
be a “majority rules” approach where if over half of the frames are reported as
stegged, than the whole video is considered stegged. This requires decoding the
entire video, which may be very costly.
As shown in section 4.2, a better solution might be use a sequential test where
after each frame a decision can be made whether to accept it as stegged, reject it
as non-stegged, or test the next frame. A statistical reference book [13] provides
just such a method. If more stegged frames than would be predicted by the false
positive rate appear, then the video is likely stegged. Conversely, if more clean
frames than would be predicted by our false negative rate appear, then the video
is likely not-stegged. Indeed, the method also allows for specifying how confident
it should be in the determination.
A simplifying assumption made here is that either all frames have embedded
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data, or no frames do. Some forms of relaxing that assumption have simple so-
lutions, and others do not. For example, the assumption that data is embedding
starts from the beginning of the video and continues until the entire message is
encoded might be handled by looking for a fall-off in the number of stegged im-
ages over time. However, a steganographer that embeds randomly throughout a
video and keeps the overall number of frames embedded below the frame classifier’s
false-positive rate would be much harder to detect.
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CHAPTER 4
Evaluation
Evaluation is done into two parts. First, classification systems for each frame
are considered based on the parameters discussed in section 3.2. Second, methods
for classifying the entire video are analyzed.
4.1 Feature Selection
Evaluation started with checking the efficacy of different approximation meth-
ods for the cover image as well as varied sets of features. In particular, tests were
performed on approximation by cropping, using the adjacent frame, and frame av-
eraging. Both the features used in Fridrich and Pevny´’s paper [1] as well as newer
features from Liu [2] were tested.
The original paper by Fridrich applied an SVM with a Gaussian kernel for
classification. In our prior work with images[3], an LDA gave similar performance,
with less overhead in model building. Early in this current project, a comparison
of LDA and linear SVM’s showed that LDA performance was superior, and so the
research proceeded with that. For comparison purposes, another attempt to use
radial kernels using tune.svm function, from R[4] package e1071[5], was performed.
The tune.svm function will search the parameter space of the kernel function and
return the best values for the given set of data. The recommended parameters
were C = 1, γ ≈ 2−8.1. These parameters were then used against the entire data
set. These new results do show better classification in most cases, particularly in
some of the higher embedding rates. For example, at 20% embedding it correctly
classifies Simple Steg and improves MBSteg by 7-8%. The low embedding rates of
MBSteg embedded videos only improve by less than 2-6%. Preliminary results are
shown in the Appendix.
25
To evaluate the detection technique, cross-validated, trained LDA models clas-
sified a test data set of videos that are stegged at different embedding rates. Two
different steganographic techniques were tested. One of them is a modified ver-
sion of MBSteg[6] that embeds data in each frame. The second is a more na¨ıve
implementation that just changes every AC DCT value with abs(x) > 1 up to the
embedding rate percentage.
Previously, our JPEG work had very good accuracy down to 15% embed-
ding [3]. Since one of the goals of steganalysis is to lower the effective bandwidth
of a steganographic carrier, the effectiveness of the models was tested on several
lower rates, as listed below.
Table 2 presents the parameters just outlined, adding just one more for quality
of the video.
Parameter Values
Feature Sets Fridrich [1], Markov [2]
Cover Approximations Crop, Frame averaging, Next
Steg Programs SimpleSteg, MBSteg
Embedding Rates 5, 10, 15, 20, 50
Quality Levels 2, 5
Table 2. Parameters for evaluation
The cover approximations do not apply to the Markov process used in Liu’s
feature set. All other combinations of these parameters are valid and were tested.
In the analysis below, note that expectation is that accuracy on videos with data
embedded by MBSteg is lower than those from SimpleSteg, due to the differences
in how the steganography programs work. Additionally, the accuracy is lower as
the embedding rate goes down as there are fewer changes to detect.
Table 3 shows the error rates if a model is built over all frames of a video using
only Fridrich’s feature set with cropping approximation. The rates are much lower
than expected based on the work with image classification. After looking at the
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raw data, the problem is immediately obvious. The data from P and B frames is
significantly different because they are not representing an entire picture. Because
the features include statistics that compare adjacent blocks of the image, having
missing data skews those statistics dramatically.
Q-scale Embed Rate FP Rate FN Rate Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 35.3% 30.3% 32.8%
10 28.0% 22.7% 25.4%
15 21.4% 19.9% 20.7%
20 18.3% 19.4% 18.8%
50 12.7% 13.7% 13.2%
5 5 52.6% 38.5% 45.6%
10 47.2% 35.3% 41.2%
15 45.2% 32.3% 38.8%
20 39.8% 27.6% 33.7%
50 20.4% 14.5% 17.5%
MBSteg
2 5 46.0% 34.8% 40.4%
10 42.3% 26.2% 34.2%
15 38.1% 22.1% 30.1%
20 32.5% 22.9% 27.7%
50 24.2% 21.5% 22.9%
5 5 53.1% 41.9% 47.5%
10 53.9% 37.4% 45.6%
15 49.9% 34.1% 42.0%
20 49.7% 33.1% 41.4%
50 36.2% 25.5% 30.8%
Table 3. Error over all frames
Given that I, P and B frames are all going to have different statistics, it is
logical to create different models for each type. Table 4 and Table 5 show the rates
given by the classifier for P and B frames, again using Fridrich’s features with
cropping.
These error rates are also very high, again because of the missing data. Per-
forming DCT-reconstruction, by re-compressing the spatial frame, would not in-
crease the accuracy much since the effective embedding rate is so much lower in
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Q-scale Embed Rate FP Rate FN Rate Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 16.37% 19.67% 18.02%
10 9.61% 7.51% 8.56%
15 4.20% 3.75% 3.98%
20 2.25% 2.55% 2.40%
50 1.20% 0.75% 0.98%
5 5 44.14% 31.53% 37.84%
10 38.74% 26.13% 32.43%
15 32.73% 20.42% 26.58%
20 29.43% 18.32% 23.87%
50 16.82% 19.07% 17.94%
MBSteg
2 5 46.70% 44.44% 45.57%
10 37.39% 39.79% 38.59%
15 35.44% 31.98% 33.71%
20 30.93% 28.53% 29.73%
50 7.21% 6.16% 6.68%
5 5 56.01% 37.54% 46.77%
10 51.35% 36.19% 43.77%
15 47.30% 31.08% 39.19%
20 45.50% 30.33% 37.91%
50 33.33% 20.72% 27.03%
Table 4. Error over P frames
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Q-scale Embed Rate FP Rate FN Rate Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 42.73% 34.31% 38.52%
10 36.03% 28.06% 32.04%
15 29.78% 27.21% 28.49%
20 26.06% 26.80% 26.43%
50 18.61% 20.27% 19.44%
5 5 48.28% 36.88% 42.58%
10 47.31% 28.41% 37.86%
15 44.27% 24.57% 34.42%
20 37.51% 26.58% 32.04%
50 29.95% 25.14% 27.55%
MBSteg
2 5 54.81% 36.88% 45.85%
10 51.78% 34.59% 43.18%
15 51.03% 31.27% 41.15%
20 45.30% 27.95% 36.63%
50 26.86% 18.61% 22.74%
5 5 53.55% 42.15% 47.85%
10 55.61% 38.20% 46.91%
15 52.92% 35.45% 44.19%
20 54.47% 34.71% 44.59%
50 40.21% 28.92% 34.56%
Table 5. Error over B frames
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P and B frames. Because of this, the steganalysis will proceed by looking only at
the I frames of the video.
The next set of tables (Table 6 through Table 9) gather the results from tests
run across only the I frames of each video.
It appears from Table 9 that the Liu feature set is not well suited to MPEG
videos, as its best performance is a 12.5% error rate. That may be because of
the low resolution of the videos. As their paper shows, accuracy of their method
depends on image complexity, with lower complexity making detection easier. Be-
cause the video resolution is small, but generally has the same field of view as an
image, its complexity is fairly high.
Using the Fridrich feature set, Tables 6 through 8 show that Cropping is the
only approximation method to achieve 0% error on any group of videos. It also
has consistently better performance by several percentage points on almost all
sets, with the exception of some of the lower embedding rates, although all meth-
ods perform terribly there. The other two approximation methods have similar
performance, with the average difference between them only being a couple of per-
centage points different in most cases. Only on SimpleSteg with a qscale of 2 does
Frame Averaging do consistently better than Next frame.
In evaluating performance on individual videos, it is clear that videos with a
lot of motion are classified more accurately by cropping than by the other approx-
imation techniques. This indicates that the changes even in 1/30th of a second are
too great to use adjacent frames as an reference, either independently or averaged
with other nearby frames. From these results, it is clear that the best choices
for future tests would be the features from [1] with the cropping method of cover
approximation in all future tests. All the remaining data presented uses features
extracted in this way.
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Method Quality Embed % FP Rate % FN Rate % Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 34% 30% 32%
10 20% 26% 23%
15 6% 11% 9%
20 5% 11% 8%
50 0% 0% 0%
5 5 33% 29% 31%
10 13% 9% 11%
15 4% 8% 6%
20 1% 7% 4%
50 0% 0% 0%
MB Steg
2 5 53% 34% 44%
10 41% 27% 34%
15 29% 41% 35%
20 22% 22% 22%
50 9% 7% 8%
5 5 41% 52% 47%
10 48% 34% 41%
15 33% 33% 33%
20 24% 29% 26%
50 12% 12% 13%
Table 6. Error rates using [1] under varying Quality and Embedding Rate using
Cropping calibration
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Method Quality Embed % FP % FN % Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 42.13% 46.30% 44.21%
10 34.26% 35.19% 34.72%
15 27.78% 35.19% 31.48%
20 23.61% 28.70% 26.16%
50 3.70% 7.87% 5.79%
5 5 35.19% 41.20% 38.19%
10 30.56% 31.48% 31.02%
15 22.22% 25.93% 24.07%
20 18.52% 22.22% 20.37%
50 7.41% 6.48% 6.94%
MBSteg
2 5 40.28% 46.30% 43.29%
10 30.09% 43.06% 36.57%
15 27.78% 36.11% 31.94%
20 29.63% 28.24% 28.94%
50 12.50% 17.13% 14.81%
5 5 43.06% 46.76% 44.91%
10 35.65% 39.81% 37.73%
15 36.11% 35.65% 35.88%
20 29.17% 30.56% 29.86%
50 14.35% 18.06% 16.20%
Table 7. Error rates using [1] under varying Quality and Embedding Rate using
Next Frame calibration
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Method Quality Embed % FP % FN % Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 48.00% 32.00% 40.00%
10 26.00% 28.00% 27.00%
15 19.00% 30.00% 25.00%
20 13.00% 21.00% 17.00%
50 3.00% 7.00% 5.00%
5 5 42.00% 39.00% 41.00%
10 37.00% 32.00% 34.00%
15 26.00% 23.00% 25.00%
20 17.00% 25.00% 21.00%
50 6.00% 7.00% 7.00%
MBSteg
2 5 44.00% 43.00% 43.00%
10 38.00% 35.00% 37.00%
15 33.00% 37.00% 35.00%
20 28.00% 33.00% 30.00%
50 11.00% 9.00% 10.00%
5 5 48.00% 45.00% 47.00%
10 37.00% 39.00% 38.00%
15 38.00% 34.00% 36.00%
20 35.00% 29.00% 32.00%
50 14.00% 14.00% 14.00%
Table 8. Error rates using [1] under varying Quality and Embedding Rate using
Frame Averaging calibration
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Method Quality Embed % FP % FN % Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 32.87% 20.83% 26.85%
10 33.33% 15.74% 24.54%
15 23.61% 20.83% 22.22%
20 23.61% 17.13% 20.37%
50 21.76% 10.19% 15.97%
5 5 45.37% 37.50% 41.44%
10 51.39% 25.93% 38.66%
15 50.00% 22.69% 36.34%
20 50.00% 24.07% 37.04%
50 50.93% 18.06% 34.49%
MBSteg
2 5 38.89% 45.83% 42.36%
10 32.87% 39.81% 36.34%
15 27.78% 33.80% 30.79%
20 22.69% 29.17% 25.93%
50 12.04% 12.96% 12.50%
5 5 30.09% 65.28% 47.69%
10 24.54% 59.72% 42.13%
15 23.15% 58.80% 40.97%
20 23.15% 56.94% 40.05%
50 15.28% 35.65% 25.46%
Table 9. Error rates using [2] under varying Quality and Embedding Rate
34
4.2 Video Classification
The above results give error rates on a frame by frame basis. The goal now is
to classify the video as a whole. In [7] they use a simple majority rule, so if more
frames are classified as stegged, then the video is considered stegged. The effect of
varying that threshold is shown in Table 10. The table shows the error rates for
each quality level over all embedding rates.
Threshold SS/Q2 SS/Q5 MB/Q2 MB/Q5
0.1 0.16 0.14 0.33 0.34
0.2 0.16 0.11 0.28 0.33
0.3 0.11 0.08 0.27 0.32
0.4 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.32
0.45 0.11 0.07 0.23 0.27
0.5 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.26
0.55 0.1 0.06 0.22 0.29
0.6 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.29
0.7 0.11 0.07 0.24 0.29
0.8 0.16 0.08 0.29 0.31
0.9 0.18 0.11 0.3 0.32
Table 10. Video error rates at various frame thresholds
Because the false positive and false negative rates are similar (see Table 6), a
majority rule does, in fact, give the lowest overall error. That is, from the table
it is evident that using a threshold of 50% of the frames has the lowest error rate.
Note that this is also due to similar prevalence in the test set. In real-world use,
this might need adjustment. In the test data, there are 50% stegged videos and
50% clean videos. A real data set will have a much higher number of clean videos,
so the classifier might be adjusted to expect a lower prevalence of steg. However
making this adjustment also make it less reliable for positively identifying stegged
video frames. See [8] for a full description of how adjusting the LDA cutoff changes
the Positive Predictive Value for the image classifier.
Table 11 shows the results of using the majority rule. These results are better
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Q-Scale Embed Rate FP Rate FN Rate Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 22.0% 22.0% 22.2%
2 10 11.0% 22.0% 16.7%
2 15 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2 20 0.0% 6.0% 2.8%
2 50 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
5 5 28.0% 22.0% 25.0%
5 10 0.0% 6.0% 2.8%
5 15 0.0% 6.0% 2.8%
5 20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
5 50 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MBSteg
2 5 56.0% 22.0% 38.9%
2 10 22.0% 17.0% 19.4%
2 15 17.0% 33.0% 25.0%
2 20 17.0% 6.0% 11.1%
2 50 6.0% 0.0% 2.8%
5 5 33.0% 44.0% 38.9%
5 10 50.0% 22.0% 36.1%
5 15 28.0% 28.0% 27.8%
5 20 11.0% 22.0% 16.7%
5 50 11.0% 6.0% 8.3%
Table 11. Video classification errors with majority rule
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than those for the individual frames as shown in Table 6. This is because the error
rates of the frame classifier are low enough that the percentage of clean or stegged
frames can stabilize above the threshold.
There is one further optimization that could be made when classifying video.
Because decoding video is an expensive operation, it is desirable to stop processing
as soon as decision can be reached. What is necessary is a method that looks at
the cumulative results as it processes each frame and decides whether or not it has
seen sufficient evidence to classify the entire video. To do this, a method found in
[9] for a sequential test of a binomial distribution seems appropriate.
The method uses four parameters, α, β, θ0, and θ1. It then requires track-
ing the number of frames marked as non-stegged, dm, and the number of frames
processed, m. The parameters α and β are used to control confidence bounds on
overall classification. False positives are controlled by α and false negative errors
by β. To obtain 95% confidence, both are set to 0.025. The θ0 and θ1 parameters
control the proportion of stegged or non-stegged frames below which the mistakes
may be from the frame classifier.
From these values, the method computes Am, the accepting boundary, and
Rm, for rejection, as shown below in Equation 1 and Equation 2. Equation 3
shows the constraint under which it must continue processing the video.
Am =
log β
1−α
+m log 1−θ0
1−θ1
log θ0
θ1
+ log 1−θ0
1−θ1
(1)
Rm =
log 1−β
α
+m log 1−θ0
1−θ1
log θ0
θ1
+ log 1−θ0
1−θ1
(2)
Am < dm < Rm (3)
If the false positive rate of αf and false negative rate of βf for the frame
classifier, then θ0 = βf and θ1 = 1− αf .
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If dm < Am, then the video is considered stegged, because of the m frames
processed, more of them are classified stegged than would be expected by the false
positive rate and a margin wide enough for α. On the other hand, if dm > Rm, then
more frames are classified as non-stegged than expected for the frame classifier’s
false negative rate plus the margin of β, so the video must not be stegged.
Two plots demonstrating this method are shown in Figure 3. The upper
figure shows a non-stegged video tested with the parameters for a SimpleSteg 10%
embedded video of with a qscale of 2. The second shows a stegged video with
an embedding rate of 20% and a qscale of 2. Note that the distance between the
accepting and rejecting lines is further apart at the lower embedding rate because
there is more uncertainty in the underlying frame classification.
Table 12 shows the result of the sequential test. Table 13 shows the comparison
between the sequential test and the majority test. The sequential test is generally
lower than that of the majority rule, especially for the low embedding rates. They
both perform equally well, perfectly in fact, in the easiest case of 50% embedding
using SimpleSteg. They are also comparable for MBSteg at that embedding rate,
with majority rule getting 2.8% error, and Sequential getting 3% error for qscale=2.
At the lower embedding rates it seems the accuracy is much worse, with 50% for
the sequential test while at 20-25% for the majority rule at the 10-15% embedding
rate.
The reason the sequential test does worse is because the underlying classifiers
have high false positive and false negative error rates, it makes it difficult for the
sequential test to complete and be confident in the result. The videos are very
short clips, so it is possible that a longer test might yield better results. For the
higher embedding rates, however, the sequential tests are nearly as accurate and
only need to process a fraction of the frames to make that determination.
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Figure 3. Decision process for non-stegged (top) and stegged (bottom) videos
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Q-scale
Embed
Rate
θ0 θ1 FP Rate FN Rate Undecided
Overall
Accuracy
% Frames
processed
Simple Steg
2 5 0.34 0.7 5.56% 11.11% 36.1% 56.0% 75%
2 10 0.2 0.74 0.00% 16.67% 11.1% 81.0% 44%
2 15 0.06 0.89 0.00% 0.00% 0.0% 100.0% 19%
2 20 0.05 0.89 0.00% 11.11% 0.0% 94.0% 18%
2 50 0.05 0.95 0.00% 0.00% 0.0% 100.0% 17%
5 5 0.33 0.71 27.78% 11.11% 16.7% 64.0% 61%
5 10 0.13 0.91 5.56% 5.56% 2.8% 92.0% 22%
5 15 0.04 0.92 0.00% 5.56% 0.0% 97.0% 18%
5 20 0.01 0.93 5.56% 0.00% 2.8% 97.0% 13%
5 50 0.05 0.95 0.00% 0.00% 0.0% 100.0% 17%
MBSteg
2 5 0.53 0.66 11.11% 0.00% 86.1% 8.0% 97%
2 10 0.41 0.73 22.22% 11.11% 33.3% 50.0% 73%
2 15 0.29 0.59 11.11% 22.22% 33.3% 50.0% 69%
2 20 0.22 0.78 16.67% 11.11% 2.8% 83.0% 34%
2 50 0.09 0.93 5.56% 0.00% 0.0% 97.0% 20%
5 5 0.41 0.48 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 0.0% 97%
5 10 0.48 0.66 16.67% 11.11% 58.3% 28.0% 92%
5 15 0.33 0.67 11.11% 22.22% 33.3% 50.0% 71%
5 20 0.24 0.71 5.56% 16.67% 11.1% 78.0% 53%
5 50 0.12 0.88 11.11% 11.11% 0.0% 89.0% 19%
Table 12. Sequential test parameters and accuracy
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Q-Scale Embed Rate Threshold Sequential
Simple Steg
2 5 77.8% 56.0%
2 10 88.3% 81.0%
2 15 100.00% 100.0%
2 20 97.2% 94.0%
2 50 100.0% 100.0%
5 5 75.0% 64.0%
5 10 97.2% 92.0%
5 15 97.2% 97.0%
5 20 100.0% 97.0%
5 50 100.0% 100.0%
MBSteg
2 5 61.1% 8.0%
2 10 88.6% 50.0%
2 15 75.0% 50.0%
2 20 88.9% 83.0%
2 50 97.2% 97.0%
5 5 61.1% 0.0%
5 10 63.9% 28.0%
5 15 72.2% 50.0%
5 20 83.3% 78.0%
5 50 91.7% 89.0%
Table 13. Comparison Video classification accuracy with threshold vs. sequential
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
To summarize the above process, this research has determined that by using
the best available steganography detection for DCT-embedded JPEG images, ap-
plying it to only the I-frames of an MPEG, a fairly accurate video steganalysis can
be created. Furthermore, for medium and high embedding rates, a statistical test
can be performed during processing that will minimize the time taken to classify
the video. This is important because of the proliferation of video content.
When compared with the results from [1], the results above show that de-
tecting steganographic data in MPEG is significantly more difficult than in JPEG
data. Those results achieved, even at 5% embedding rates, an overall accuracy of
93-95%. The reason may partly be because of the quantization done in MPEG
videos. Although both formats use similar techniques, the quantization matrices
from MPEG are not derived in the same way as JPEG. The MPEG specification
was designed for small images and low bandwidth. This means that quality of
the image is generally very poor. Even in the image results, there is a drop off in
classification as the quality of the image decreases. This happens because more of
the data is forced to zero, so no useful statistics can be collected.
Detecting steganography is only the first step for investigators. The next
step is to extract the data. While some work in this has been done, such as in
stegbreak [2], it is necessarily incomplete. The first issue is deciding which of
several steganographic techniques was applied. Second it is necessary to decide
which particular program embedded the data (see [3] for an example of multi-
class analysis), and in some cases even the version is important. Third, in order
to extract the data most steganographic programs require a password. If the
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program uses any sort of encryption, and most do, then testing each password
requires expensive calculations.
Because of this, even relatively low false positive rates means spending an
inordinate amount of time trying to crack encryption, only to find no data is
there. Deciding that the correct data has been extracted is also a challenge. Some
steganographic programs will tell the user if data was extracted successfully, how-
ever from a steganographer’s point of view that is a bad design. Stegbreak measures
the entropy of the extracted data, which works well if the embedded data is text
or a well known file format. However, if a steganographer is aware of this tech-
nique, they could easily encrypt their data before embedding it, where it will be
encrypted again. This would easily foil the entropy test, as encrypted data should
be indistinguishable from noise.
In the statistical analysis of the image classifier provided in [4], it is shown
that with some manipulation of the threshold used, the classifier can be more se-
lective in deciding to classify an image or frame as stegged. It also shows that
these classifiers work best when the prevalence of steganography nearly one-to-one
with non-stegged media. This is obviously not the case. Therefore an examiner
must work to pre-classify data by other means, such as being part of other corre-
spondence, or by time line information that correlates with the investigation.
While steg-analysts continue to make headway in the arms race with steganog-
raphers, a good steganographer will always have the upper hand. The variety of
techniques and places to hide data are nearly unlimited, and steganalysis cannot
begin without some knowledge of the technique employed. Even given the caveats
listed here, hopefully this research will deter some steganographers from assuming
video is a high-capacity way to get their message out.
Although this work focused on MPEG videos, almost all other video codecs use
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DCT and quantization to reduce the amount of data and make further compression
possible. Other codecs also have similar concepts of key and differential frames, but
differ in the spacing, calculation, and encoding. To use the steganalysis performed
in this project in other codecs, some analysis of the spread of coefficient values
through the frame types to see if the assumptions of the feature set used still hold.
Different models might need to be built for various frame types. Most of the newer
codecs have greater distance between key frames, so models specific to differential
frames will become more important. Some newer codecs allow the quantizer to
change within a frame, to adjust the level of detail in part of the image. This
might mean re-evaluating the feature sets which currently build models that are
quality level dependent. Additionally, other frame classifiers might yield more
accurate results, as indicated by preliminary testing of the Gaussian kernel SVM
shown in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX
Preliminary SVM Results
As explained in Chapter 4, a late development included testing an SVM model
for frame classification instead of the LDA model. The results here show the error
rates of a radial kernel using the parameters C = 1, γ = 2−8.
Q-scale Embed Rate FP Rate FN Rate Overall Error
Simple Steg
2 5 12.5% 14.8% 13.7%
10 4.2% 4.2% 4.2%
15 1.9% 0.5% 1.2%
20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
50 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
5 5 10.2% 13.4% 11.8%
10 0.9% 4.6% 2.8%
15 0.5% 0.9% 0.7%
20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
50 2.3% 0.0% 1.2%
MBSteg
2 5 46.3% 34.3% 40.3%
10 38.0% 21.8% 29.9%
15 29.2% 10.6% 19.9%
20 17.6% 10.2% 13.9%
50 2.3% 1.9% 2.1%
5 5 77.3% 11.6% 44.4%
10 47.2% 23.1% 35.2%
15 39.8% 12.0% 25.9%
20 27.3% 11.1% 19.2%
50 6.5% 0.0% 3.2%
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